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Abstract. This paper examines the nature of the electoral coalitions that
develop surrounding gubernatorial candidates in the states of the Great
Plains. It focuses on the contribution various groups make toward the elec-
toral success orfailure ofgubernatorial candidates, highlighting the under-
lying political divisions within a state's population. This paper marks afirst
step into the study ofthese coalitions by offering a basic description ofthem.
Some discussion ofhow electoral coalitions respond to candidate and cam-
paign-related factors is presented. The implications of these findings are
discussed, along with several considerations for further research. The data
used for this analysis come from election day exit polls and a content
analysis of the newspaper coverage of each campaign.
It is often said of politicians that if you want to know what they stand
for, simply look at the people who support them. Such a statement carries
with it a slightly negative connotation in contemporary politics as it suggests
somehow that politicians are controlled like puppets by special interests.
However, the notion of responsiveness to a constituency and of politicians
acting as delegates as opposed to trustees is equally consistent with our
initial assertion. In this sense, if you want to know what a politician stands
for, you should look at the people who elected him or her. Thus, one justifi-
cation for considering the composition of a candidate's electoral coalition is
that there are clear implications for policy representation. In that sense, we
examine electoral coalitions because we believe that there will be some
connection between the shape of that coalition and the behavior of elected
officials following the election (Brown 1995; Wright 1993b; Wright and
Berkman 1986).
There are certainly long-term components to the nature of group sup-
port for political parties (Brown 1995; Erikson et al. 1993) and candidates
(Axelrod 1970,1974,1978,1982,1986). Yet, there remains the question of
how electoral coalitions respond to short-term forces. If politicians respond
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to the interests of those who elected them, can they influence the composi-
tion of their electoral coalition prior to election day? The first concern
addresses how elites respond to coalitions of voters, while the second con-
cern lies with groups of voters reacting to political elites. This paper focuses
on this second concern.
Given that this analysis is of gubernatorial electoral coalitions, a brief
consideration of gubernatorial electoral politics is necessary. There is little
agreement among scholars regarding the nature of voting in gubernatorial
elections. Disagreement exists among those claiming that incumbent gover-
nors are held accountable for the economic well-being of their states (Howell
and Vanderleeuw 1990; Chubb 1988) and those who feel governors escape
much ofthe blame for state economic troubles (Stein 1990; Peltzman 1987).
While many look to the role played by national-level politics in determining
voting behavior in gubernatorial elections (Chubb 1988; Stein 1990;
Holbrook-Provow 1987; Simon, 1989), many argue that gubernatorial elec-
tions are becoming increasingly independent of presidential politics
(Tompkins 1988; Jewell and Olson 1988; Cohen 1983). In particular, several
scholars have concluded that gubernatorial elections often turn on state-
specific factors (Jewell and Olson 1988; Tompkins 1988; Erikson et al.
1993).
Evidence exists suggesting that the specific campaign-related activi-
ties of gubernatorial candidates influences voting behavior in these elections
(Carsey 1995; Cook et al. 1992; Sigelman 1989). Thus, gubernatorial elec-
tions provide a unique opportunity for studying electoral coalitions because
of their semi-independence from presidential politics, the importance of
election-specific factors in determining outcomes, and the likelihood that
the actions of candidates produce a response among voters.
Finally, the Great Plains provides an excellent setting for this initial
foray into the analysis of gubernatorial electoral coalitions. A regional
approach makes the task of examining multiple electoral coalitions more
manageable, and the Great Plains is a superb region to consider. It consists
of states with a wide range of political cultures and sociodemographic
compositions, and it's Populist heritage fosters a dynamic political environ-
ment.
Coalitions
Beginning with Axelrod (1970), most research on political coalitions
has focused on describing presidential electoral coalitions (see Axelrod
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1974, 1978, 1982, 1986; Stanley et al. 1986, Rabinowitz and Macdonald
1986). This work illustrates the group components of particular coalitions,
attempting to identify those groups that make a significant contribution to a
party's or candidate's coalition of support. More resent research has begun
to explore how the nature of a state's coalitional basis of partisan identifica-
tion leads to particular policy outcomes (Brown 1995) and the nature of the
relationship between the behavior of elected officials and the coalitions that
mobilize to support them (Wright 1993b). This paper adds to both traditions
by expanding the descriptive work to gubernatorial electoral coalitions and
by providing some initial analysis of the reaction of electoral coalitions to
the choices among candidates with which voters are presented.
In studying state-level electoral coalitions, comparisons can be made
both within states and across states. Variation in a variety of factors includ-
ing demographic composition, political culture, and political ideology may
produce different electoral coalitions across states. The coalition supporting
a Democratic candidate in one state may differ from the coalition supporting
Democrats in other states.
Additionally, the coalition that mobilizes around a candidate from the
Democratic party likely differs from the coalition supporting the Republican
counterpart within each state. This may seem like a point so obvious it is not
worth stating. However, if candidates running for Governor from the two
major parties behaved in a simplified Downsian way (Downs 1957), their
behavior both before and after the campaign would lead them to converge to
the interests of the median voter in the state. In that sense, it would not matter
which candidate won or who supported them because their behavior would
be virtually identical. While little work exists on the coalitional support for
gubernatorial candidates, several scholars have shown that candidates for
Congress do not represent the median voter in their constituency, focusing
instead on what is often called their re-election constituency.
Fenno's (1978) classic work on the behavior of House members dem-
onstrated that elected officials seek to represent the interests of those who
supported their candidacy. In fact, little consideration is given to the con-
cerns of those whom the representative felt were not likely to be supporters.
This echos the findings of Kingdon (1966) who noted that candidates from
the two major parties have very different conceptions of the groups that
support them. Legislators representing the same districts but who are not
members of the same political party have very different voting records
(Fiorina 1974; Erikson & Wright 1993; Wright 1993b). Finally, members of
political parties and party activists specifically do in fact have divergent
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policy preferences (Erikson et al. 1993; Miller and Jennings 1986). Clearly,
differing composition of party membership and the role played by party
activists, particularly in the nomination process (Aldrich and McGinnis
1989), prevents candidates from converging completely. Thus, in describing
gubernatorial electoral coalitions, this paper will make comparisons across
the ten states that are part of the Great Plains as well as comparisons between
parties within these states.
Campaigns and Coalitions
Current research remains unclear regarding the response of voters, and
thus electoral coalitions, to the messages they receive from candidates dur-
ing their campaigns. Johnston et al. (1992:4) assert that campaigns provide
voters with the incentive to vote by "'priming' [them] to consider deep
seated values which motivate their choice." In that way, campaigns serve to
focus the attention of voters on a few key issues. In contrast, Gelman and
King (1993) suggest that while campaigns do provide information to voters,
their actual impact is negligible because each campaign is largely balanced
by that of the opponent's. Both views suggest that campaigns serve an
informational role. However, Gelman and King's (1993) view clearly does
not allow for the content of a campaign to matter, and even Johnston et al.'s
(1992) argument about priming suggests that campaigns simply tap the long
standing divisions between voters, activating them for election day.
However, other research presents a stronger case for the short-term
influence of the content of campaigns on the shape of electoral coalitions.
Stonecash (1989) shows that a more polarized choice between gubernatorial
candidates produces a more polarized electorate. This also is the case for
Congressional (Wright 1978) and Senatorial elections (Wright and Berkman
1986).
Bartels (1993) has shown that voters respond at least in part to the
information on presidential campaigns that they receive via the news. In
addition, Franklin (1991) has shown that the perceptions voters have of U.S.
Senate candidates responds to the nature of the messages sent out by the
candidates. Finally, Carsey (1995) presents evidence that the salience of
specific cleavages among voters responds directly to the issues stressed by
gubernatorial candidates during their campaigns.
Thus, while some disagreement remains, ample evidence suggests that
voters do in fact respond to the messages they receive from candidates.
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Where this analysis differs from that cited above is in its focus on the
behavior of groups of voters rather than on individuals.
The Great Plains
The analysis presented in this paper is of gubernatorial electoral coali-
tions in those states parts of which comprise the region known as the Great
Plains. They are: Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming. While sharing a num-
ber of characteristics in common that distinguish states in this region from
other regions in the U.S., there remains a substantial degree of diversity
within the Great Plains.
For example, in states like Kansas, Nebraska, and North Dakota, the
proportion of the population that identifies with the Republican party is
larger than the proportion identifying with the Democratic party by 9 per-
centage points. In contrast, Democrats enjoy an even larger advantage over
Republican identifiers in Texas (13 percentage points) New Mexico (16
percentage points) and Oklahoma (21 percentage points) (see Erikson, et al.
1993).
In addition, all three of Elazar's (1984) political culture topologies are
represented in this region: Colorado, Kansas, Montana, North Dakota, and
South Dakota are Moralistic; Nebraska and Wyoming are Individualistic;
and New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas are Traditionalistic.
Finally, Erikson et al. (1993) show that even after accounting for the
demographic composition of each state, there remains a unique state-spe-
cific component to the partisan and ideological make-up of each state's
citizenry. As will be shown, some patterns persist across many of the states
in this region. However, other factors remind us that each state maintains
some uniqueness.
Data and Methods
The analysis in this paper focuses on 24 gubernatorial elections held
between 1982 and 1994 in the ten U.S. states that comprise the Great Plains
region. Table 1 reports the specific elections under consideration. For these
elections, I present information regarding the composition of electoral coa-
litions based on gender, race/ethnicity, income, party identification, and in
most cases religious affiliation and political ideology.
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TABLE 1
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS AND
THE NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN EACH ELECTION INDICAT-
ING THAT THEY VOTED IN THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION
STATE YEAR
1982 1986 1990 1992 1994 Total
Colorado 1,216 1,538 1,002 3,756
Kansas 1,635 712 2,347
Montana 492 492
Nebraska 1,252 1,354 1,184 3,790
New Mexico 1,161 980 1,200 3,341
North Dakota 747 747
Oklahoma 1,329 1,138 2,467
South Dakota 933 781 1,714
Texas 2,044 1,478 2,832 1,607 7,961
Wyoming 893 868 1,240 3,001
Total 5,350 3,627 II,317 1,239 8,083 29,616
The data used to measure electoral coalitions comes from exit polls
conducted in each state on election day. Table 1 also presents the number of
respondents in each state indicating a choice in that particular gubernatorial
election. The elections included in this analysis were selected based upon
the availability of an exit poll. In that sense, this cannot be considered a
random sample. More specifically, Wright (1993b) has noted a tendency
toward the inclusion of more tightly contested races as a result of using exit
polls. However, every state in the region is included at least once, and 8 out
of the 10 are included at least twice. Thus, I view this as a reasonable sample.
The divisions among voters examined in this study are based on race!
ethnicity, gender, income, party identification, ideological identification,
and religious affiliation. Race!ethnicity is divided into three categories:
blacks, Hispanics, and whites. Income is reported as annual family income,
and is measured in 5 categories: Under $15,000; $15,000 to $29,999; $30,000
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to $49,999; $50,000 to $99,999; and those making $100,000 or more. Party
identification is measured with a simple classification as Democrat, Repub-
lican, or Independent, while self-identified political ideology is categorized
as Liberal, Conservative, or Moderate. Finally, three religious affiliations
are identified: Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. Unfortunately, the exit polls
do not allow for the distinction between fundamentalist and/or evangelical
Christians and those who are not. As a result, there is likely much interesting
behavior taking place among those voters calling themselves Protestants that
cannot be examined.
Exit polls provide the only reasonable source of data for the study of
gubernatorial electoral coalitions. The analysis of political coalitions re-
quires that adequate samples of voters be employed so that reasonable
estimates of the behavior of sub-populations can be obtained. The exit polls
used in these studies average 1,234 voters in each gubernatorial election,
ranging from 492 in the 1992 Montana gubernatorial election to 2,832 in the
1990 Texas race. In addition, exit poll data is gathered with the intention of
producing samples that are representative of the state. First, a set of voting
precincts are randomly selected within each state. Then, voters are randomly
selected within each precinct, giving every voter an equal probability of
being included in the study.
The only other source of data on voting behavior in gubernatorial
elections is the American National Election Study (ANES) series. This
source of data in not appropriate for the present analysis because of the
small and non-representative samples that are gathered within each state. In
addition, Wright (1993a) has demonstrated that the ANES contains a serious
mis-report of voting behavior in gubernatorial elections that cannot be
corrected. This mis-report is believed to be due to the response of those
interviewed for the survey to the actual results of the election. Because exit
polls are administered before the outcome of the election is known, the
potential for such bias in mitigated.
This paper also begins to explore how electoral coalitions respond to
the nature of the choices presented to voters. Variables that could be consid-
ered include the ethnic and gender characteristics of the candidates and
whether or not an incumbent is running. In addition, however, some atten-
tion will be paid to the themes stressed by candidates during their cam-
paigns. To measure the content of campaigns, I undertook a content analysis
of the newspaper coverage of each gubernatorial campaign included in the
study held between 1982 and 1994. For each election, I read every article
dealing with the gubernatorial election in a single major newspaper from
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each state from October 1st through election day. Instead of using a me-
chanical coding process of counting words or paragraphs devoted to particu-
lar subjects, I coded the content of campaigns more subjectively. In this
regard, I used the information in the newspapers as an informant rather than
as raw data. This allowed me to take seriously the analysis presented in the
newspaper coverage, make judgments regarding the content of campaign
advertising, and most importantly, prevent the measures of campaign con-
tent from being biased by variation in the style of newspaper reporting
(Carsey 1995)
As will become clear, the study of electoral coalitions for several
elections in several states can quickly produce a complexity of comparisons
that cannot be reasonably presented in a single paper. Thus, much of the
discussion of how coalitions respond to changes in candidate and campaign
characteristics is based on the selective comparison of a few of the races
under consideration.
Finally, some debate exists regarding whether to study political coali-
tions using bivariate or multivariate techniques. This analysis adopts a bi-
variate approach. In other words, I examine the contribution of each group
under consideration to the candidates running for governor one at a time.
Thus, unlike a multivariate approach, I will not be able to discuss the
importance of the differing contribution of men and women to particular
electoral coalitions while having controlled in a statistical sense for the
influence of other factors like race, income, party identification and the like.
The drawback to a bivariate approach stems precisely from this lack of
statistical control. Because individual membership across gender, racial!
ethnic, religious affiliation, income, and political groups overlaps, I will not
be able to argue that the composition of a political coalition is as it is due
primarily to ethnicity versus religious affiliation, for example. A multivari-
ate approach would provide for that level of control.
However, a bivariate approach has several distinct advantages. First,
the focus of this study is on the contribution various groups make to elec-
toral coalitions. A multivariate analysis, for example a logit model regress-
ing support for the Democratic or Republican candidate on the individual
voter characteristics of gender, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, income,
party identification, and political ideology would be able to distinguish
which characteristics are the strongest predictors of individual voting be-
havior. However, such an approach would not provide any information regard-
ing how many of such voters exist in an electorate, thereby failing to provide
some measure of that group's importance to the electoral coalition of a candi-
date. Some efforts have been made to weight the size of a group's popula-
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tion by the probability a member of that group will support a particular
candidate based on exactly the kind of multivariate logit model just de-
scribed (Erikson et al. 1989; Stanley et al. 1986), but Brown (1995) argues
that the techniques applied so far still fail to capture the contribution made
by groups to political coalitions.
To avoid such complications, another approach would be to produce
distinct categories of individuals based on each variable included in the
model. Thus, instead of comparing the contribution of men and women to a
Democratic candidate's electoral coalition, we could compare the contribu-
tion oflow-income, Catholic, conservative, Hispanic women who are Demo-
crats to the contribution of low-income, Catholic, conservative, Hispanic
men who are Democrats. Given that the analysis that follows includes two
categories for gender, three categories each for race/ethnicity, party identi-
fication, religious affiliation, and political ideology, and 5 categories for
income, the resulting analysis would consist of comparing the contribution
of 810 different groups (2x3x3x3x3x5=810). As Wright (1993b) suggests,
such an analysis would prove too cumbersome. Thus, this analysis opts for
the more manageable and arguably more appropriate analysis of bivariate
relationships between these various characteristics and voting behavior.
Group Loyalty and Contribution
The preceding discussion touches on the original presentation of elec-
toral coalitions in presidential elections made by Axelrod (1970) in which he
discusses group loyalty and group contribution. Axelrod measures group
loyalty as the percentage of the members of a group that support a particular
party or candidate. In that sense, if 100 voters in a particular election were
conservatives, and 70 of them voted for the Republican candidate, then the
loyalty of conservatives to the Republican candidate would simply be 70%.
In contrast, the contribution made by a group to an electoral coalition
Axelrod measures as the percentage of the votes received by a particular
candidate or party that come from a particular group. Again, suppose that the
Republican candidate in our example received a total of 140 votes. Since 70
ofthose votes came from conservatives, we know that conservatives contrib-
uted 50% of the votes received by this particular candidate.
Multivariate analysis is better able to tap the loyalty dimension by
showing how holding a particular individual-level characteristic influ-
ences the probability that members of that group will support a particular
candidate. That is exactly what regression and logit coefficients are de-
signed to do. However, as Brown (1995) points out, such coefficients do
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not consider the size of that population. For example, a logit model predict-
ing the probability of voting for the Democratic candidate for governor as a
function of the variables discussed thus far produces a positive and statisti-
cally significant coefficient for whether or not a person is Hispanic in the
1982 races in both Nebraska and New Mexico. Thus, in both instances, being
Hispanic increased the probability of supporting the Democrat. In fact, the
simple bivariate loyalty scores of Hispanics in the two races are also similar:
82% of Hispanics surveyed in Nebraska reported having voted for the Demo-
cratic candidate for governor in 1982, while 86% of Hispanics made the
same claim in New Mexico that year. Of course, the obvious problem with
using this information alone to discuss the role played by Hispanics in
electoral politics in these two races is that the size of the Hispanic population
differs dramatically between these two states. In the 1982 exit poll for
Nebraska, only 11 people surveyed were Hispanic. In contrast, 362 Hispan-
ics were included in the New Mexico exit poll, representing nearly one-third
of all those surveyed.
This difference is captured in the contribution score calculated for
Hispanics in each race. In 1982, the Hispanics that voted for the Democratic
candidate for governor in Nebraska constituted only 1% of the votes re-
ceived by that candidate. In contrast, fully 50% of the votes received by the
Democratic candidate in New Mexico that year came from Hispanics. From
the perspective of policy representation and the electoral considerations of
candidates, it seems that the score that matters most is the contribution score.
Despite the same level of loyalty in the 1982 elections, one could scarcely
expect the Democratic candidate in Nebraska to make issues of specific
concern to Hispanics a central campaign or policy item while his counterpart
in New Mexico could expect to benefit from doing so. Clearly this is an
extreme example, but it does serve to highlight the distinction between
loyalty and contribution as well as point again to the potential pitfalls of
using multivariate approaches to studying electoral coalitions when group
influence rather than individual behavior is the main focus. Loyalty scores
will be presented as part of this analysis, but most of the attention is devoted
to a discussion of the contribution various groups make to gubernatorial
coalitions.
Findings
Table 2 presents the simple bivariate loyalty scores of voters to the
Democratic candidate for governor at each election divided in terms of race/
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ethnicity, gender, income, party identification, religious affiliation, and po-
litical ideology. The two-party loyalty score for the Republican candidate
for each group would simply be 100 minus the cell entries in Table 2. The last
row in Table 2 simply reports the mean loyalty of all the voters included in
the exit polls for these 24 elections. It is worth noting that the overall
percentage of the votes received by Democratic candidates across these
elections was 55%. Thus, the last row in Table 2 reports that across these
states, 86% of all African Americans voted for the Democratic candidate for
governor. Similarly, 78% of Hispanics voted for the Democrat while only
50% of white voters did so. On average, Democrats enjoyed a slight advan-
tage among women as compared to men. In addition, voters with lower
incomes were more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate.
Not surprisingly, Democrats captured the votes of 83% of those saying
they identify with the Democratic party. Fully one-fourth of Republican
identifiers crossed over in these elections. When looking at the political
ideology of voters, Democrats did well among self identified liberals, al-
though not as well as they did among their own partisans. In addition,
Democratic candidates captured 52% of the votes of those labeling them-
selves as conservatives. Interestingly, Democratic candidates did best among
those labeling themselves as ideological moderates. Finally, the traditional
division between Protestant and Catholic voters between Republican and
Democratic candidates respectively appears clearly in Table 2 as well.
Thus, the mean proportions of loyalty among voters to gubernatorial
candidates of each party across all these elections, as shown in the last row
of Table 2, largely conforms to expectations. The one exception may be the
near equal split among conservative voters between candidates from the two
parties. This is due primarily to the significantly larger number of voters in
this region identifying themselves as conservatives (27% identify as conser-
vative; 12% identify as liberal).
What is striking about Table 2 is the variation between elections, even
within some states. For example, Democratic candidates in 1994 won from
33% of the white vote in Oklahoma to 77% ofthe white vote in Nebraska. In
five of the 24 elections, the Democratic loyalty of low income voters was
more than 10 percentage points below the average for all income groups,
while in 7 other elections, the Democrat won the majority of votes among
those making $100,000 a year or more.
Two Democrats, Ben Nelson in Nebraska in 1994 and Mike Sullivan in
Wyoming in 1990, were able to win more than 50% of the votes cast by
Republicans. In contrast, in half of the remaining elections, the Democratic
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TABLE 2
GROUP LOYALTY SCORES FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE
FOR GOVERNOR MEASURED AS THE PERCENTAGE
OF RESPONDENTS IN A GROUP THAT VOTED
FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATE*
INCOME
State/Elec Black White Hisp. Female Male Low Middle High
C086 92 58 78 62 59 61 61 60 64 56
C090 72 67 81 71 65 60 70 68 67 72
C094 97 59 80 68 58 77 61 58 62 61
KS90 81 54 75 55 55 60 57 54 50 37
KS94 100 38 40 47 32 61 44 35 32 26
MT92 0 46 NA 49 43 53 45 42 54 42
NE82 60 50 82 50 51 56 53 52 44 31
NE90 50 53 80 53 53 65 57 53 42 31
NE94 87 77 100 81 75 80 81 77 76 76
NM82 70 37 86 55 54 68 61 50 45 36
NM90 75 42 78 56 52 66 57 51 47 25
NM94 69 34 72 50 43 60 56 42 37 39
ND92 17 43 NA 43 40 48 45 42 33 24
OK90 88 66 90 70 65 83 71 64 52 55
OK94 71 33 45 37 31 52 42 33 31 20
SD86 38 49 33 47 52 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
SD90 67 39 75 37 43 41 42 37 32 55
TX82 84 44 78 56 48 72 61 55 44 27
TX86 85 42 83 54 48 59 57 51 50 40
TX90 93 45 77 64 51 77 64 54 49 45
TX94 95 41 73 58 48 74 59 50 49 38
WY82 73 64 84 68 63 75 71 68 62 38
WY90 55 66 52 63 70 60 62 69 67 67
WY94 38 38 60 42 35 44 37 41 41 18
Mean 86 50 78 57 52 64 58 54 50 41
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TABLE 2 continued
State/Elect Demo Repub Indep Liberal Conserv Mod Catholic Prot Jewish
C086 90 40 65 82 40 65 67 54 88
C090 91 48 65 84 49 72 73 64 86
C094 90 39 59 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
KS90 78 36 61 DNA DNA DNA 70 52 8
KS94 81 11 42 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
MT92 76 17 43 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
NE82 79 24 58 71 32 57 63 52 83
NE90 79 29 56 66 40 59 55 51 100
NE94 95 65 81 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
NM82 78 23 48 74 32 61 75 24 67
NM90 79 24 46 DNA DNA DNA 69 43 40
NM94 79 10 42 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
ND92 76 13 39 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
OK90 89 29 69 DNA DNA DNA 61 65 100
OK94 72 6 30 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
SD86 78 22 47 58 39 54 DNA DNA DNA
SD90 62 20 44 DNA DNA DNA 45 35 0
TX82 83 12 34 78 30 63 59 60 53
TX86 84 14 39 76 29 64 64 43 63
TX90 88 19 54 84 35 68 64 51 66
TX94 92 14 48 88 26 67 61 43 85
WY82 92 41 72 74 50 73 70 59 78
WY90 79 54 70 DNA DNA DNA 68 68 0
WY94 78 15 45 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
Mean 83 26 52 64 52 69 78 35 61
* Note that two-party Republican Loyalty scores would be 100 minus the
Democratic Loyalty scores.
DNA =Did Not Ask this question on this exit poll.
NA = Not Available.
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TABLE 3
GROUP CONTRIBUTION SCORES FOR THE DEMOCRATIC
CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR MEASURED AS THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE VOTES RECEIVED BY THE DEMOCRAT THAT CAME
FROM THAT GROUP
INCOME
State/Elec Black White Hisp. Female Male Low Middle High
C086 5 85 9 53 47 13 22 23 24 18
C090 2 87 8 52 48 11 25 34 25 6
C094 6 79 13 56 44 12 19 22 34 12
KS90 4 94 1 53 47 16 33 33 17 1
KS94 5 90 2 60 40 21 25 25 26 4
MT92 0 98 NA 60 40 22 36 25 13 4
NE82 2 96 1 50 50 20 34 25 16 4
NE90 1 95 2 50 50 20 34 31 13 2
NE94 4 94 1 51 49 10 26 36 25 3
NM82 3 43 50 52 48 26 28 21 20 5
NM90 5 49 41 57 43 26 31 28 14 1
NM94 2 49 35 55 45 19 27 26 20 7
ND92 0 98 NA 55 45 20 35 32 9 4
OK90 5 88 1 58 42 27 30 26 14 3
OK94 5 88 2 57 43 18 29 24 23 5
SD86 1 98 0 46 54 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
SD90 1 97 1 47 53 28 37 23 10 2
TX82 19 69 11 54 46 17 22 28 26 7
TX86 21 65 14 53 47 14 22 24 23 16
TX90 29 54 14 58 42 18 32 29 17 4
TX94 25 54 20 60 40 16 26 27 26 5
WY82 2 94 3 52 48 14 23 32 25 5
WY90 1 95 2 51 49 11 27 40 21 2
WY94 1 92 4 58 42 17 25 30 27 2
Mean 9 78 11 54 46 17 28 29 21 5
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TABLE 3 continued
State/Elect Demo Repub Indep Liberal Conserv Mod Catholic Prot Jewish
C086 52 17 31 26 21 53 28 43 4
C090 44 23 32 24 19 56 29 50 2
C094 52 23 25 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
KS90 45 31 24 DNA DNA DNA 24 62 0
KS94 63 14 23 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
MT92 57 12 32 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
NE82 59 22 19 16 23 61 33 52 3
NE90 56 22 22 17 23 59 29 53 1
NE94 40 38 22 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
NM82 69 12 19 28 17 54 62 24 2
NM90 69 15 15 DNA DNA DNA 49 33 1
NM94 77 8 15 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
ND92 57 10 34 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
OK90 76 13 11 DNA DNA DNA 9 65 0
OK94 82 9 9 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
SD86 65 18 17 13 28 59 DNA DNA DNA
SD90 60 25 15 DNA DNA DNA 37 50 0
TX82 77 6 17 18 24 58 22 60 1
TX86 72 8 20 26 25 49 27 45 2
TX90 68 10 22 23 23 55 25 46 2
TX94 67 9 24 29 19 52 30 33 3
WY82 47 27 26 14 27 60 22 59 1
WY90 35 42 22 DNA DNA DNA 24 52 0
WY94 56 19 25 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
Mean 60 18 22 16 17 56 28 37 2
DNA =Did Not Ask This Question on this Exit Poll
NA =Not Available
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TABLE 4
GROUP CONTRIBUTION SCORES FOR THE REPUBLICAN
CANDIDATE FOR GOVERNOR MEASURED AS THE PERCENTAGE
OF THE VOTES RECEIVED BY THE REPUBLICAN THAT CAME
FROM THAT GROUP
INCOME
StatelElec Black White Hisp. Female Male Low Middle High
C086 1 95 4 51 49 13 22 23 21 21
C090 2 93 4 45 55 15 22 33 25 5
C094 0 92 6 46 54 6 20 27 34 13
KS90 1 97 0 53 47 13 30 34 20 3
KS94 0 97 2 44 56 9 20 30 35 7
MT92 0 97 NA 54 46 17 39 29 10 4
NE82 2 98 0 51 49 16 30 24 21 9
NE90 1 97 1 50 50 13 30 32 22 4
NE94 2 98 0 43 57 9 22 39 28 3
NM82 2 87 10 50 50 15 22 25 29 10
NM90 2 80 14 53 47 16 29 33 20 3
NM94 1 80 11 48 52 11 18 31 30 10
ND92 1 98 NA 52 48 15 31 32 13 9
OK90 2 94 0 51 49 12 26 31 27 5
OK94 1 96 1 51 49 10 22 28 29 12
SD86 1 98 0 50 49 DNA DNADNA DNA DNA
SD90 0 98 0 54 46 26 34 25 14 1
TX82 4 93 3 46 54 7 15 24 35 19
TX86 4 92 3 47 53 10 17 24 24 25
TX90 3 90 6 44 56 8 26 34 26 7
TX94 2 89 8 49 51 7 21 32 31 10
WY82 1 98 1 46 54 9 18 28 29 16
WY90 2 92 3 55 45 14 31 34 19 1
WY94 1 96 2 50 50 14 28 28 25 4
Mean 2 93 4 49 50 12 24 29 25 9
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TABLE 4 continued
StatelElect Demo Repub Indep Liberal Conserv Mod Catholic Prot Jewish
C086 9 65 26 9 48 43 21 57 I
C090 10 53 37 10 43 47 23 60 1
C094 10 61 29 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
KS90 15 66 18 DNA DNA DNA 13 70 2
KS94 9 70 21 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
MT92 15 49 36 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
NE82 15 71 14 7 48 46 20 71 1
NE90 17 63 20 10 41 49 27 60 0
NE94 7 75 19 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
NM82 24 51 25 12 45 43 26 59 1
NM90 22 57 22 DNA DNA DNA 26 52 I
NM94 18 64 18 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
ND92 13 48 40 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
OK90 20 69 10 DNA DNA DNA 12 72 0
OK94 17 72 II DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
SD86 18 63 19 9 42 49 DNA DNA DNA
SD90 24 63 12 DNA DNA DNA 29 60 0
TX82 17 47 36 5 58 36 17 73 1
TX86 15 52 32 9 63 28 16 61 I
TX90 13 61 26 6 59 35 19 62 2
TX94 7 64 29 5 65 30 23 53 1
WY82 8 74 19 9 50 41 18 68 1
WY90 17 66 22 DNA DNA DNA 21 45 1
WY94 10 70 20 DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA DNA
Mean 15 62 24 6 40 41 20 63 1
DNA = Did Not Ask This Question on this Exit Poll
NA = Not Available
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candidate polled fewer than 20% of the votes from Republicans. Thus, while
the mean proportions over all elections presented in Table 2 provide a
valuable summary of average group loyalty to gubernatorial candidates
across the Great Plains, substantial variation exists from state to state, and
from election to election within states. This volatility implies that election-
specific factors, if not random error, influences voting behavior.
As mentioned above, knowing the loyalty of members of a particular
group to candidates of a particular party does not necessarily shed light on
the importance of that group to a candidate's electoral coalition. We also
must consider the size of the contribution members of that group make to a
coalition. Tables 3 and 4 present the contribution made by members of each
group to the electoral coalitions of the Democratic and Republican candi-
dates respectively. These values represent the percentage of a candidate's
votes that came from members of that particular group. The last row of each
table presents the mean contribution score for all 24 elections.
Looking first at race/ethnicity, it is clear that candidates from the
Democratic party mobilize very different coalitions in Texas and New Mexico
than they do in any of the other Plains states. Between 20 and 30% of the
votes received by Democrats in the four Texas elections came from African
Americans. No other Democratic gubernatorial coalition approaches these
levels, due primarily to the small numbers of blacks living in other Plains
states. Between 35 and 50% of the votes received by Democrats in New
Mexico came from Hispanic voters. Hispanics made a sizeable contribution
to Democratic candidates in Texas and to a lesser degree in Colorado as well.
Again, Democrats running for Governor in other Plains states generally
receive only 1 or 2% of their votes from Hispanics. In fact, Democrats
running for Governor in a Plains state other than Colorado, New Mexico, or
Texas receive fewer than 10% of their votes from blacks and Hispanics
combined.
Republican candidates depend much less on the support of black and/
or Hispanic voters in general, and there is much less variation across states
for Republican candidates. Hispanics do contribute 10% or more of the votes
received by GOP candidates in New Mexico. However, only in New Mexico
in 1990 and 1994, and in Texas in 1994 did white voters comprise less than
90% of the coalition that supported the Republican candidate.
The gender division across these elections appears to be the result
primarily of a split between male and female supporters of Democratic
candidates. On average, 54% of the votes received by Democrats were from
women, while only 46% of their votes came from men. For Republicans, the
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respective figures were 49% and 50%. Again, substantial variation exists
between elections. In several elections, fully 60% of the supporters of the
Democratic candidate were women. In contrast, the Democratic candidate
for governor in South Dakota in 1986 and 1990 received more votes from
men than from women. While variation exists in the contribution made to
GOP election coalitions by men and women, the difference between the
percentage of votes coming from men and from women is generally smaller
among Republican voters.
Tables 3 and 4 show that Democratic candidates received anywhere
from 11 to 28% of their votes from individuals making less than $15,000 a
year. Similar variability is found in Republican coalition importance among
voters making $50,000 or more per year (the two highest categories). As will
be discussed in more detail below, there is also substantial variation across
elections regarding the contribution of low income voters to Democratic
candidates relative to the contribution made by high income voters to Re-
publican candidates.
From the standpoint of party identification, it is clear that candidates
from both parties generally rely on substantial contributions from members
of their own political parties. Indeed, in Texas, between 67 and 77% of the
voters supporting the Democratic candidate for governor identified them-
selves as Democrats. Similarly large contributions were made by partisans
of each party to their respective candidates in several additional elections.
Again, however, for every rule, there are at least a few exceptions. By virtue
of winning a majority of the votes from Republican identifiers (Table 2), the
Democratic candidate in Nebraska in 1994 received almost as many votes
from Republicans as he did from Democrats. Likewise, the Democratic
candidate in Wyoming in 1990 actually received a greater number of votes
from those identifying themselves as Republicans than he did from those
calling themselves Democrats. While variation exists among the contribu-
tion of partisans to the coalitions of Republican candidates, they generally
seem to rely less on cross-over support than do their Democratic counter-
parts.
A striking feature of Tables 3 and 4 is the role played by ideological
liberals, conservatives, and moderates. On average, Democratic candidates
for governor in the Great Plains receive slightly more of their votes from
those calling themselves conservative than they do from self-identified lib-
erals. Furthermore, in every case, Democratic candidates received at least
49% of their votes from ideological moderates. In contrast, Republican
candidates generally received 40% of their votes from ideological conserva-
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tives. Conservatives constituted a majority or plurality of the supporters for
Republican candidates in 8 of the 12 elections in which ideology was mea-
sured. Thus, Democratic candidates for governor in the Great Plains tend to
mobilize more ideologically diverse coalitions than do their Republican
opponents.
Finally, Tables 3 and 4 present the religious division among supporters
of gubernatorial candidates. Catholics generally make a larger contribution
to Democratic candidate coalitions than they do to Republican coalitions,
though this was not the case in Oklahoma in 1990. Furthermore, if you
remove from consideration the contribution made by Catholics to Demo-
cratic candidates in Oklahoma, which is very low, and New Mexico, which
is well above average, there is less volatility in the contribution made by
Catholics to electoral coalitions than we have seen regarding other charac-
teristics. With the exception of the same states on the Democratic side, the
contribution made by Protestants also appears reasonably more stable, and
consistently in the favor of Republican candidates. While Table 2 presented
Jews as reasonably loyal to Democratic candidates, Tables 3 and 4 make
clear the fact that Jews do not constitute a significant portion ofthe electoral
coalition for any of the candidates of either party in these 24 elections in the
Plains.
In summary, Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that the composition of elec-
toral coalitions vary widely between the states of the Great Plains, and also
within states across different elections. Differences in the concentration of
certain population groups, notably a larger contingent of blacks in Texas and
of Hispanics in New Mexico, Texas, and to a lesser degree, Colorado,
account for some of the differences in the composition of electoral cleav-
ages. However, variation in population characteristics alone cannot explain
the variation observed in the contribution scores presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Certainly any small variation which may exist in the number of men and
women living in each state cannot account for the variation in the contribu-
tion made by men and women to gubernatorial candidates election coali-
tions, particularly for Democrats. Finally, Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that the
coalitions mobilized by Democratic candidates for governor are typically
more diverse demographically, ideologically, and even in partisan terms
than those mobilized for Republican candidates.
Table 5 presents the degree to which the electoral coalitions mobilized
for each particular election were polarized along each socio-demographic
category. The entries in the table are simply the contribution scores of each
group for the Democratic candidate minus the contribution scores of each
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group for the Republican candidate. Thus, positive scores indicate a differ-
ence that favors the Democratic candidate, while negative scores indicate a
GOP advantage within that group in terms of the contribution of votes.
Because it is computed from Tables 3 and 4, Table 5 illustrates the same
basic patterns that have already been described in terms of the volatility of
the contribution made by voters in these various categories to gubernatorial
candidates of one party or another. Table 5 shows that in some cases, a
substantial gender gap exists among voters, typically showing a Democratic
advantage among women, but not always. The impact of race and ethnicity
in Texas and New Mexico is illustrated dramatically. The variation in the
contribution made by low and high income groups to candidate coalitions
suggests that the salience of social class varies across elections, often within
states. Finally, Table 5 shows that the magnitude of the division between
partisans as well as that between liberals and conservatives, also varies from
election to election. In summary, Table 5 presents in a more simplified form
the importance of various cleavages within the electorate for each election in
terms of measuring the differential contribution made by each group to each
candidate.
Having demonstrated substantial variation in the loyalty scores and
election coalition contributions made by different groups to gubernatorial
candidates, and also in Table 5 that the importance of each of these socio-
demographic factors varies across elections, the final step is to begin to
explain some of this variation. While noting the role played by regional
variation in the distribution of some population characteristics above, what
is of equal interest is why the salience of these characteristics varies even
within the same state from election to election. As cited above, previous
research has established that the salience to individual voters of socio-
demographic factors and even issue positions held by voters, measured in
terms of their probability of supporting a particular candidate, responds to
candidate behavior and characteristics (Carsey 1995). This analysis begins
to explore whether or not the importance of socio-demographic differences
among voters in terms to group contributions to candidate coalitions also
responds to campaign and candidate-specific factors. Rather than discuss
every socio-demographic group for every election, I choose instead to present
some illustrative examples.
One of the factors the gender cleavage may respond to is the gender of
the candidates competing. In Wyoming in 1982, both the Democratic and
Republican candidates running for governor were male. In that election,
won handily by the Democrat (63% to 37%), the Democrat enjoyed a
62 Great Plains Research Vol. 7 No.1, 1997
TABLE 5
POLARIZATION OF ELECTORAL COALITIONS. CELL ENTRIES
ARE THE CONTRIBUTION SCORE OF EACH GROUP TO THE
DEMOCRAT MINUS THE CONTRIBUTION SCORES
TO THE REPUBLICAN*
INCOME
State/Elect Female White Black Hispanic Protestant Catholic Low High
C086 2 -10 4 5 -14 7 0 0
C090 7 -8 0 4 -10 6 -4 1
C094 10 -13 6 7 DNA DNA 6 -1
KS90 0 -3 3 1 -8 11 3 -5
KS94 16 -7 5 0 DNA DNA 12 -12
MT92 6 1 0 0 DNA DNA 5 3
NE82 -1 -2 0 1 -19 13 4 -10
NE90 0 -2 0 1 -7 2 7 -11
NE94 12 -4 2 1 DNA DNA 1 -3
NM82 2 -44 1 40 -35 36 11 -14
NM90 4 -31 3 26 -29 23 10 -8
NM94 7 -31 1 24 DNA DNA 8 -13
ND92 3 0 -1 0 DNA DNA 5 -9
OK90 7 -6 3 1 -7 -3 15 -15
OK94 6 -8 4 1 DNA DNA 8 -13
SD86 -4 0 0 0 DNA DNA DNA DNA
SD90 -7 -1 1 1 -10 8 2 -3
TX82 8 -24 15 8 -13 5 10 -21
TX86 6 -27 17 11 -16 11 4 -10
TX90 14 -36 26 8 -16 6 10 -12
TX94 11 -35 23 12 -20 7 9 -10
WY82 6 -8 1 2 -9 4 5 -15
WY90 -4 3 -1 -1 7 3 -3 3
WY94 8 -4 0 2 DNA DNA 3 0
Mean 4.9 -12.5 4.7 6.5 -13.7 9.3 5.7 -7.7
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TABLE 5 continued
State/Elect Democrats Independents Republicans Liberals Moderates Conservatives
C086 43 5 -48 17 10 -27
C090 34 -5 -30 14 9 -24
C094 42 -4 -38 DNA DNA DNA
KS90 30 6 -35 DNA DNA DNA
KS94 54 2 -56 DNA DNA DNA
MT92 42 -4 -37 DNA DNA DNA
NE82 44 5 -49 9 15 -25
NE90 39 2 -41 7 10 -18
NE94 33 3 -37 DNA DNA DNA
NM82 45 -6 -39 16 11 -31
NM90 47 -7 -42 DNA DNA DNA
NM94 59 -3 -56 DNA DNA DNA
ND92 44 -6 -38 DNA DNA DNA
OK90 56 1 -56 DNA DNA DNA
OK94 65 -2 -63 DNA DNA DNA
SD86 47 -2 -45 4 110 -14
SD90 36 3 -38 DNA DNA DNA
TX82 60 -19 -41 13 22 -34
TX86 57 -12 -44 17 21 -38
TX90 55 -4 -51 17 20 -36
TX94 60 -5 -55 24 22 -46
WY82 39 7 -47 5 19 -23
WY90 18 0 -24 DNA DNA DNA
WY94 46 5 -51 DNA DNA DNA
Mean 45.6 -1.7 -44.2 13 24.5 -28.7
* Low income refers to those below $15,000 per year while High income
includes those at or above $50,000 a year (the last two categories of income
from Tables 2 through 4 combined).
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contribution from women voters 6 percentage points higher than his GOP
opponent. This advantage is only slightly above the 24 election mean and
was due primarily to the weak showing among women by the GOP candi-
date. In 1990, however, the GOP candidate was female and the Democratic
candidate was male. Table 5 shows that the gender gap reversed in Wyoming
for this election, with the Republican candidate having a 4 percentage point
advantage among women in terms of the proportion of votes contributed.
Despite this shift, the Democrat still won with more than 60% of the vote. In
1994, the tables were turned: Democrats nominated a female candidate
while Republicans nominated a male. This time, the Republican candidate
won handily (57% to 43%), but the gender gap shifted back toward a strong
Democratic advantage among women as compared to men. Thus, each time
a woman ran for governor in Wyoming, a Republican in 1990 and a Demo-
crat in 1994, the gender gap moved to reflect that fact.
A similar pattern appears in Texas. The magnitude of the difference in
the contribution made by female voters to the two gubernatorial candidates
running in Texas grows noticeably in the 1990 and 1994 elections as com-
pared to 1982 and 1986. Of course, the two races in the 1990s involved Ann
Richards as the Democratic candidate running against a male opponent. In
the two earlier races, both candidates were male. Richards made a conscious
effort to mobilize women during her two campaigns. In particular in 1990,
she made abortion rights a critical part of her campaign. She also benefitted
in 1990 from an opponent, Clayton Williams, who made several disparaging
remarks about women. Thus, not only did the gender of the candidates play
a potential role, but their actions did as well.
However, politics is never as simple as just knowing the gender of a
candidate, and women do not blindly vote for other women. Kansas presents
a nice illustration. In 1990, Democrat Joan Finney ran for Governor against
incumbent Republican Mike Hayden. Finney ran as a populist political
reformer. However, she ran opposed to any tax increases and she was pro-life
on abortion. Hayden, who was vulnerable because of policy decisions re-
garding taxes, was pro-choice on abortion, and actively sought to use this
issue to his advantage. In the end, both candidates received similar contribu-
tions of votes from men and from women, meaning that the gender gap was
actually reduced from its mean of a 5 percentage point advantage among
women voters for Democratic candidates. Finney won. In 1994, with an
unpopular Finney retiring, both parties nominated men. Democrat Jim
Slattery's coalition revived a strong gender split among Kansas voters,
which became manifest in the form of women being less likely to abandon
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his candidacy than were men. Commentary on the 1994 Kansas race sug-
gests that Slattery was the victim of being the candidate of a minority party
in terms of voter party identification saddled with an unpopular President,
Congress, and governor from the same party.
This conclusion leads to another cleavage among voters that responds
to the content of campaigns: partisanship. Sticking with the two Kansas
elections, Table 5 clearly shows that the contribution of partisans to their
candidates was much more sharply defined in the 1994 election than it was
it 1990. The 1990 campaign was not particularly partisan in nature, and both
candidates in 1990 held some policy positions that conflicted with tradi-
tional party labels. However, in 1994, as mentioned above, party affiliation
played a more prominent role in the electoral process because campaign
issues were more congruent with usual party platform positions.
The example of Kansas in 1994 is mirrored in the other states of the
Great Plains. The influence of the coordinated national Republican cam-
paign for control of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994, symbolized
by the Contract With America, spilled over into the state-level elections for
governor as well. The average polarization scores for Democratic and Re-
publican identifiers presented in Table 5 for elections held prior to 1994 are
43 for Democrats and -41 for Republicans. However, in 1994, those figures
increased in absolute value to 51 for Democrats and -51 for Republicans.
Clearly, candidate coalitions in 1994 were more clearly defined in partisan
terms than were candidate coalitions prior to 1994. A number of GOP
gubernatorial candidates in the Great Plains worked consciously to link their
campaigns to the themes stressed by the Contract With America and the
partisan focus of the national campaign, apparently with some success.
Conclusions
The stories to tell about each campaign and the various components of
the resulting coalitions could continue. As others have suggested, guberna-
torial elections often turn on campaign-specific factors (Erikson et al. 1993;
Jewell & Olson 1988). However, for this research to produce useful insights,
ultimately, it must yield some generalizations.
First, this paper begins to demonstrate the utility of examining guber-
natorial elections by focusing on the contribution made to candidate coali-
tions by various groups. This analysis demonstrates that it is not enough to
know that a particular characteristic increases or decreases the probability
that anyone individual voter will support a candidate. While important for
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understanding individual voting behavior, such a focus misses the mark if
the goal is to explore an election outcome. A focus on group contribution as
a way to study elections also fits more squarely with the language used by
candidates to describe their constituencies (Fenno 1978; Carsey 1995).
Candidates think in terms of groups of voters that provide then with large
blocks of support.
Second, in demonstrating the volatility of electoral coalitions, this
analysis further justifies the continued study of electoral politics in a com-
parative fashion. Analysis at a national or even regional level yields valuable
insights into general patterns of behavior. However, such a focus masks a
substantial amount of variation in electoral politics. No doubt the study of
gubernatorial electoral coalitions does the same relative to state legislative
electoral coalitions.
We would not be as concerned about the hidden variation in state
political coalitions if that variation were random, since the information lost
through focusing only on regional or national patterns would be of little
interpretive value. However, what the final portion ofthis analysis begins to
show is that the variation in the contribution made to electoral coalitions by
members of various groups responds in apparently predictable ways. Spe-
cifically, the composition of electoral coalitions in the Plains states responds
to the nature of the choice between candidates with which voters are pre-
sented. This finding is consistent with other research on electoral coalitions
in a single state: New York (Stonecash 1989); and with the analysis of the
salience of individual level characteristics to voters in gubernatorial elec-
tions across states (Carsey 1995). Electorates appear to respond to the
information they receive about candidates in meaningful ways.
Finally, this analysis sheds some light on the nature of politics in a
region of the U.S. that is understudied in political science. The geography
and history of the Great Plains have produced much that these 10 states share
in common. For example, this is a region in which twice as many people call
themselves conservative as liberal. It is also a region in which most states do
not face major state-level racial or ethnic political divisions because the
populations in most of these states are overwhelmingly white. However, the
region also presents great diversity. Racial and ethnic politics are particu-
larly salient in Texas and New Mexico. As noted above, all three of Elazar's
state political culture types are represented in the region. Finally, for every
generalization put forth in this paper, at least one counter example exists
within the region. Clearly the states of the Great Plains present scholars with
ample opportunity to study and learn about politics.
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There are three basic steps further research in this area should take.
First, further development of a technique to incorporate both some sense of
voter loyalty and group contribution into a single comparative analysis is
needed. Both factors are critical for understanding electoral politics, and a
method for discussing them both should be constructed. It is possible that
further modifications of a multivariate approach would be fruitful.
Second, a more systematic comparison across elections of the influ-
ence of candidate and campaign factors should be pursued. This analysis
only considered 24 elections held in 10 states, and the discussion of cam-
paign influences on the composition of electoral coalitions was limited to
just a few elections and a more limited set of divisions among coalitions. Yet,
this analysis threatens to bury the reader (and the author) in data. The ability
to present a more general analysis depends upon finding a way to simplify
the presentation of the large amounts of data involved in studying electoral
coalitions.
Finally, further research should begin to explore the impact of the
nature of electoral coalitions on the shape of state policy. Do governors
pursue different policy objectives when their own electoral coalitions dif-
fer? Does policy respond to the preferences of those supporting the win-
ning candidate? If Governors do not represent the interests of major seg-
ments of their electoral coalitions, do those groups of voters hold the
Governor and/or his or her party accountable at the next election? I opened
this paper by arguing that one justification for studying electoral coalitions
is that democratic theory suggests that such policy responsiveness should
exist. Thus, once you have established the composition of electoral coali-
tions and are confident that they respond to the electoral choices which are
presented, the next step is to explore how Governors respond after election
day.
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